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Interest Rates-How Much Is Real?(II) 
In our last Weekly Letter, we began an evalua-
tion of financial-market developments in an 
attempt to determine how the markets view 
high long-term interest rates-in terms of 
high inflation expectations or high real rates. 
Specifi.cally, we showed that the stock yield 
(dividend over stock price) is a reasonable 
measu re of  the rea I rate of  retu rn on corporate 
equities, just as the bond yield is a good 
measure of  the nominal rate of return on cor-
porate debt. One wou  Id expect the real return 
on equities to be higher than the real return 
on debt, because stockholders face more 
business-cycle risks than bondholders. How-
ever, other supply and demand factors affect-
ing real interest rates would be the same in 
both markets. 
Stock yields have been remarkably stable 
over the 1978-82 period, and this suggests 
relative stability in real bond yields, although 
nominal bond yields have risen dramatically 
(Chart 1). With stable real yields, the rise in 
nominal bond yields must primarily reflect a 
rise in long-run inflation expectations. But 
why have inflation expectations risen in the 
face of  the decelerating inflation of the 
1981-82 period-and in the face of a rela-
tively restrictive monetary policy? The an-
swer is that long-run inflation expectations 
depend upon what people expect the actual 
rate of inflation to be over the next 5 to 15 
years-which in turn depends on their ex-
pectations of  future monetary policy and 
money growth. 
Debt growth vs. money growth 
Financial markets apparently fear that future 
money growth will be substantially higher 
than current policy might suggest, mainly 
because of  the projected sharp upsurge in 
Treasury financing needs. There has been a 
close assocation between the trend growth in 
the national debt and the trend growth in the 
money stock since World War II (Chart 2)-
and incidentally, the relationship was even 
c!oser during that war period. The trend rela-
tionship has broken down only in a few indi-
vidual years. In 1975-76 the debt surged with 
low money growth because of the double 
impact of an unprecedented recession and a 
unique one-time decline in money demand. 
In 1980-81 the relationship broke down be-
cause of changed Federal Reserve operating 
procedures which improved monetary con-
trol (see below). The national debt and the 
money stock both grew slowly during the 
1948-65 period, but both then accelerated 
during the 1965-81 period. And specifically, 
during the 1977-79 period, the money stock 
accelerated substantially to an 8-percent 
average growth rate-only slightly belbw the 
9-percent average growth of  the national debt 
and well above the 5%-percent mid-point of 
the Federal Reserve's avera"ge target range for 
money growth. 
Despite this long-term relationship between 
debt and money, the link between long-run 
inflation expectations (and thus bond yields) 
and national-debt growth became estab-
lished only in the past several years. Financial 
markets previously had no reason to expect 
that large growth in the national debt in any 
given year would necessarily continue into 
the future, as could be seen from the Adminis-
tration's and the Congressional Budget 
Office's forecasts for fiscal year 1976 through 
1980 (submitted to Congress in January 1975 
through January 1979}.ln those budget docu-
ments, the five-year  -out forecast called for an 
average surplus of $62 billion. These fore-
casts included a certain degree of wishful 
thinking, but still were based on reasonable 
expectations. On the revenue side, they 
reflected the steep progressiveness of 
income-tax rates, with tax receipts generally 
increasing at twice the rate of growth of in-
come. On the spending side, they reflected 
the belief that the growth of past and cur-
rently proposed government programs wou  Id 
roughly equal the growth of  national income. 
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financial markets could not reasonably fore-
cast a dramatic rise in future money growth 
based on future deficit financing, and thus 
long-run inflation expectations and bond 
yields remained unaffected. 
Expectation undermined 
Yet starting in January 1980 under President 
Carter and continuing with President Reagan, 
that comfortable expectation became sys-
tematically undermined. Following the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 
1979, President Carter's fiscal 1981  budget 
(su bm  itted in January 1980) greatly increased 
military spending without any cutback in 
social programs. As a result, the five-year-out 
spending projections increased from 49 per-
cent in the fiscal 1979 budget to 83 percent in 
the fiscal 1980 budget. This undermined the 
normal expectation of future budget sur-
pluses. The bond market responded dramat-
ically to this unexpected budget forecast, 
perhaps because of its resemblance to the 
"guns and butter" budgets of  the mid-1960's, 
which started the upward spiral of  deficits 
and money growth. Thus, the S&P bond yield 
jumped from about 10 percent just prior to 
the late-January budget announcement to a 
then-uprecedented level of 12 percent in 
early March. Long-term bond rates fell dra-
matically during the credit-control program 
of March-July 1980, but then resumed their 
upward climb, and eventually approached 
the earl ier peak just prior to President 
Reagan's inauguration in January 1981. 
These market pressures continued because 
budget balancing seemed to be relatively low 
on the new Administration's priority list. The 
three-year cut in tax rates, plus the indexing 
of  tax rates to prevent subsequent "bracket 
creep," meant that tax revenues would no 
longer rise at twice the rate of income growth. 
Despite the fiscal revolution on the revenue 
side, the Administration was able to reduce 
spending growth only back to the fiscal 1979 
level-and the national debt reflected that 
development. The Administration only belat-
edly acknowledged this change in its fiscal 
1983 budget (submitted in January 1982). 
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Projections five years out showed spending 
and revenues growing at about the same 
pace-49 percent and 54 percent, respec-
tively. And for the first time, the five-year-out 
budget (fiscal 1987) was forecast to be in 
deficit. 
The financial markets recognized the prob-
lem relatively early, and on the basis of past 
associations between deficits and money, 
began to forecast a substantial increase in 
future inflation. Thus bond yields rose from 
·11V2 percent in January to 14 percent in July 
(before passage of  the tax-cut bi II) and then to 
15V2 percent in late-August 1981 (one month 
after passage). By Apri 11982, long-term rates 
-although declining-still averaged a near-
record 14112 percent. 
Real interest rates probably increased some-
what between January 1981 and Apri 11982 -
a period when bond yields rose from 11% to 
14V2 percent. As one indication, stock yields 
rose rough Iy from 5 percent to 6 percent over 
that period. That one-percentage-point in-
crease is probably the maximum one would 
expect real bond yields to have risen, be-
cause at least part of  the rise in stock yields 
would reflect the increased business-cycle 
risk inherent in the current recession. At a 
minimum, then, two-thirdsofthe rise in long-
term rates would be due to a rise in inflation 
expectations. Financial markets thus may be 
telling us, not that monetary policy is now too 
tight, but that it may become too easy in the 
future and generate increased inflation. 
1982 VS. 1932 
How does the current financial situation 
compare with that of  the Great Depression? 
Between early 1929 and mid-1932, stock 
prices fell and stock yields went up dramati-
cally from 3% to 10 percent, reflecting the 
worsening of financial-market concerns 
aboutthe state of  the business cycle (Chart 3). 
On the other hand, long-term bond yields 
remained stable, suggesting that any decline 
in long-run inflation expectations was 
matched by a rise in real interest rates. (There 
was no major increase in default risk until late 1931, when bond yields rose from 4  Y2  per-
cent to 5  Y2  percent.) The combination of sta-
bility in bond yields and rise in stock yields 
suggested an overly tight monetary pol  icy, 
which then led to a tremendous increase in 
business-cycle risks. In retrospect, most ana-
lysts now believe that an excessively tight 
monetary policy was a major contributor to 
the severity of  the Depression, as reflected in 
the one-third decline in the money supply 
between 1929 and 1933. 
What does this analysis suggest for the cur-
rent debate about high interest rates and the 
correct monetary/fiscal policy mix? High 
long-term interest rates can be attri buted 
largely to the exceptionally large deficits ex-
pected over the next four to five years. The 
most direct way to reduce those rates-to 
break long-term inflation expectations-is to 
reduce the deficits through a comprehensive 
program of tax increases and spending de-
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creases. A second way is to break the past link 
between money and deficits, which still con-
tinues to exist in the minds offinancial-market 
participants today." Japan and other countries 
have been ableto break that link, and there is 
no reason to assume the United States cannot 
do so also. Indeed, the Federal Reserve's Oc-
tober 1979 change in operating procedures 
was designed, among other things, to break 
the link between deficits and money by im-
proving the probability of  the Fed's hitting its 
money-supply targets. The Federal Reserve's 
success in that regard thus will gradually im-
prove the Fed's credibility; but it may take 
several years of successful resistance to 
monetizing deficits for that policy to reduce 
long-term interest rates significantly. On bal-
ance, the on  Iy way to reduce rates qu  ickly is 
to reduce the market's fear of a monetary 
explosion by cutting the size of  the deficit. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commerciai Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demanddeposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savingsdeposits - total 
Time deposits - total#  . 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  +  )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings  . 
Net free reserves (  +  )/Net borrowed (  -) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
10,506  7.0 
11,793  9.3 
5,283  14.0 
5,082  9.8 
523  2.3 
466  28.1 
444  ~  6.9 
822  ~  5.3 
1,491  f- 3.6 
2,230  ~  7.7 
301  1.0 
14,161  18,1 
13,977  20.3 
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